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Abstract. Detecting backdoors is a difficult task; automating that de-
tection process is equally challenging. Evidence for these claims lie in
both the lack of automated tooling, and the fact that the vast majority
of real-world backdoors are still detected by labourious manual analysis.
The term backdoor, casually used in both the literature and the media,
does not have a concrete or rigorous definition. In this work we pro-
vide such a definition. Further, we present a framework for reasoning
about backdoors through four key components, which allows them to be
modelled succinctly and provides a means of rigorously defining the pro-
cess of their detection. Moreover, we introduce the notion of deniability
in regard to backdoor implementations which permits reasoning about
the attribution and accountability of backdoor implementers. We show
our framework is able to model eleven, diverse, real-world backdoors,
and one, more complex backdoor from the literature, and, in doing so,
provides a means to reason about how they can be detected and their
deniability. Further, we demonstrate how our framework can be used to
decompose backdoor detection methodologies, which serves as a basis
for developing future backdoor detection tools, and shows how current
state-of-the-art approaches consider neither a sound nor complete model.
Keywords: Backdoors · Formalisation of definitions · Program analysis
1 Introduction
The potential presence of backdoors is a major problem in deploying software
and hardware from third-parties. Recent studies and research has shown that
not only powerful adversaries [3], but consumer device manufacturers [2,5] have
inserted deliberate flaws in systems that act as backdoors for attackers with
knowledge of those flaws. Unlike the exploitation of traditional vulnerabilities
whereby a weird, unintended program state is reached, backdoors also manifest
as explicit, intentional, essentially normal program functionality – making their
detection significantly more challenging.
Many backdoors are considered by their manufacturers to be accidental, left-
over “debug” functionality, or ways to implement software configuration updates
without explicit user authorisation [5]. In other cases, device manufacturers de-
ploy firmware coupled with third-party software that introduces backdoor func-
tionality into their otherwise backdoor free systems without their knowledge [9].
The term “backdoor” is generally understood as something that intention-
ally compromises a platform, aside from this, however, there has been little effort
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to give a definition that is more rigorous. To give such a definition is difficult
as backdoors can take many forms, and can compromise a platform by almost
any means; e.g., a hardware component, a dedicated program or a malicious
program fragment. This lack of a rigorous definition prohibits reasoning about
backdoors in a generalised way that is a premise to developing methods to detect
them. Further hampering that reasoning – especially in the case of backdoors
of a more complex, or esoteric nature – is the sheer lack of real-world samples.
Documented real-world backdoors are generally simplistic, where their trigger
conditions rely upon a user inputting certain static data, e.g., hard-coded cre-
dentials. Such backdoors have been studied in the literature with various tools
providing solutions relying on varying degrees of user interaction [19,21].
2 Overview
This work provides first and foremost a much needed rigorous definition of the
term backdoor: which we view as an intentional construct inserted into a sys-
tem, known to the system’s implementer, unknown to its end-user, that serves
to compromise its perceived security. We propose a framework to decompose
and componentise the abstract notion of such a backdoor, which serves as a
means to both identify backdoor-like constructs, and reason about their de-
tection. While the primary focus of this work is software-based backdoors, by
modelling a backdoor abstractly, our framework is able to handle all types of
backdoor-like constructs, irrespective of their implementation target.
Many backdoors found in the real-world fall into a grey area as to whom is
accountable for their presence; to address this, we define the notion of deniabil-
ity. We model deniability by considering different views of a system: that of the
implementer, the actual system, and the end-user; this allows us to – depend-
ing on where backdoor-like functionality has been introduced – reason about if
that functionality is a deniable backdoor, accidental vulnerability, or intentional
backdoor. In many cases, attempting to model this intention, or the lack thereof,
is something that is social or political, thus we do not address such cases in this
work, instead we focus on the technical aspects of a backdoor-like functionality.
We show that under our definitions, many backdoors publicly identified are
not deniable and thus, their manufacturers should be held accountable for their
presence. Aside from manual analysis, little work has been performed to address
the detection of backdoors. We perform a study of both academic and real-world
backdoors and consider existing methods that can be used to locate backdoor
components, as well as how those methods can be improved.
2.1 Contributions
To summarise, the contributions of this work are as follows:
1. We provide a rigorous definition for the term backdoor and the process of
backdoor detection.
2. We provide a framework for decomposition of backdoor-like functionality,
which serves as a basis for their identification, and reasoning about their
detection.
3. We express the notion of deniable backdoors by considering different views
of a system: the developer’s perspective, the actual system, the end-user,
and a user analysing the system.
4. We show examples of both academic and real-world backdoors expressed in
terms of our definitions and reason about their deniability and detectability.
5. We demonstrate how our framework can be used to reason about backdoor
detection methodologies, which we use to show that current state-of-the-art
tools do not consider a complete model of what a backdoor is, and as a
result, we are able identify limitations in their respective approaches.
2.2 Related Work
Coverage of complex backdoors is scarce in the academic literature. Tan et
al. [20] encode backdoor code fragments using specially-crafted interrupt han-
dlers, which, when triggered, manipulate run-time state, and when chained to-
gether, can perform arbitrary computations in a stealthy manner. Andriesse et
al. [14] use a cleverly disguised memory corruption bug to act as a backdoor trig-
ger and embed misaligned code sequences into the target executable to act as a
payload. Zaddach et al. [24] describe the design and implementation of a hard-
drive firmware backdoor, which enables surreptitious recovery of data written to
the disk. More complex backdoors have been documented outside of the litera-
ture, e.g., those classified as“NOBUS” (i.e., NObody But US) vulnerabilites by
the NSA [7], and those associated with APT actors (e.g., [8]).
A related area, that of so-called weird machines, describes how an alterna-
tive programming model that facilitates latent computation can arise within a
program, or system. Both [16] and [18] present such models, as well as how nor-
mal systems can be forced to execute programs written in those models. In both
cases, those models provide a means to implement backdoor-like functionality.
Dullien [15] addresses the problem of formalising the term weird machine, the
relationship between exploitation and weird machines, and introduces the con-
cept of provable exploitability. He argues that it is possible to model a program,
or system using a so-called Intended Finite-State Machine (IFSM), and in do-
ing so, view a piece of software as an emulator for a specific IFSM. Further, he
demonstrates that it is possible to create security games to reason about the
security properties of a system by reasoning about it at the level of the states
and transitions of its IFSM. His model serves as inspiration for this work.
Zhang et al. [25] explore the notion of backdoor detection and give a first in-
formal definition of the term backdoor. They define a backdoor as “a mechanism
surreptitiously introduced into a computer system to facilitate unauthorised ac-
cess to the system”, which while largely agreeing with the current usage of the
term, is very high-level and says nothing about the composition of such con-
structs. Wysopal et al. [23] propose a taxonomy for backdoors. They state that
there are three major types of backdoor: system backdoors, which involve either
a single dedicated process which compromises a system, cryptographic back-
doors, which compromise cryptographic algorithms, and application backdoors,
which they state are versions of legitimate software modified to bypass security
mechanisms under certain conditions. The authors also provide strategies for
manual detection of specific types of application backdoor within source code.
Current (semi-)automated backdoor detection methods rely on detecting spe-
cific functionality that is associated with triggering backdoor behaviour. Fir-
malice [19], is a tool developed to detect backdoors within embedded device
firmware. The authors propose a model for a class of backdoors they coin au-
thentication bypass vulnerabilities. They define the notion of a security policy,
which denotes a state that a binary reaches that signifies it is in a privileged
state. Firmalice detects if it is possible to violate that security policy (i.e., find
a path to a privileged state, without passing standard authentication). HumID-
IFy [22] uses a combination of machine learning and targeted static analysis
to identify anomalous and unexpected behaviour in services commonly found
in Linux-based embedded device firmware. Meanwhile, Stringer [21] attempts
to locate comparisons with static data that lead to unique program functional-
ity; that is, functionality that can only be executed by a successful comparison
with that static data. This models the situation of a backdoor trigger providing
access to undocumented functionality. Schuster et al. [17] address the problem
of backdoor detection in binaries through the use of dynamic analysis. Using a
prototype implementation of their approach, they are able to identify a number
of “artificial” and previously identified backdoors.
3 Nomenclature & Preliminaries
In this section we outline terms used in the remainder of this article. A platform
represents the highest level of abstraction of a device that a given backdoor
targets. We define a system as the highest level of abstraction required to model
a given backdoor, within a platform. Since a backdoor can be implemented at
any level of abstraction of a platform it is designed to compromise – for example,
as a dedicated program, a hardware component, or embedded as part of another
program – we abstract away from such details. To do this, we model an abstract
system as a finite state machine (FSM).
When considering a backdoor, there are two perspectives to consider a system
from: that of the entity that implements a backdoor, and that of the end-user,
e.g., a general consumer, or a security consultant analysing the platform. To
model this situation, we consider four versions of the FSM; for any given system,
the Developer FSM (DFSM) refers to the developer’s view of the system, the
Actual FSM (AFSM) refers to the FSM that models a real manifestation of
the system, i.e., a program, the Expected FSM (EFSM) refers to the end-user’s
expectations of the system, and finally, the Reverse-engineered FSM (RFSM),
represents a refinement of the EFSM obtained by reverse-engineering the actual
system; it can include states and transitions not present within the DFSM or
AFSM, e.g., in the case of bug-based backdoors, which we address in §4.
Each state of the FSM describing a system can be viewed as an abstraction of
a particular functionality – which, in turn can be modelled using a FSM. Thus,
we view an entire system as a collection of sub-systems, which can be visualised
in a layered manner – with each layer representing a view of a part of the system
at an increasing level detail, as in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Multi-layered system FSM.
For example, if a given backdoor compromises a router, then we refer to the
router as the platform. If the backdoor is implemented in software, as a dedicated
program, we would view the highest level of abstraction, i.e., the system, as the
interactions between the processes of the operating system, modelled as a FSM.
Each individual running program, or process, can then be modelled by arbitrary
levels of FSMs.
3.1 Analysis and Formalisation of FSMs
We specify a FSM as a quintuple: θ = (S, i, F,Σ, δ), where: S is the set of
its states, i is its initial state, F is the set of its final states, Σ is the set of its
state transition conditions, e.g., conditional statements that when satisfied cause
transitions, and δ : S × Σ → S is its transition labelling function, representing
its state transitions.
Inspired by the approach taken by Dullien [15], we view the implemented,
or real system modelled by a FSM as an emulator for the AFSM of the system.
Thus, when the user’s EFSM and the AFSM are not equivalent, e.g., the user
assumes there is no backdoor present, when there is, specific interactions with
the real system will yield unexpected behaviour. How this unexpected behaviour
manifests is what determines if that unexpected behaviour means that the system
contains a backdoor. Different users of the system will assume different EFSMs.
In order to analyse a system, a program analyst, for example, will derive a RFSM
– which, for notational ease we refer to as θR – by reverse-engineering the real
system; they do this by making perceptions and observations of its concrete
implementation, i.e., the emulator for θA. What the analyst will observe is a set
of states and state transitions, which are a subset of all those possible within the
platform, e.g., CPU states. To analyse these states and derive θR, the analyst
will require a means to map concrete states and transitions of the platform, to
the level of abstraction modelled by the states and transitions of their FSM. To
perform analysis, we assume that an analyst has the following capabilities:
1. They have access to the emulator for the actual FSM (θA) – in the case of
software, this would be the program binary.
2. They are able to perform static analysis upon the emulator, i.e., using a
tool such as IDA Pro, and hence perceive a set of system states and state
transitions between those states of the real system.
3. They are able to perform dynamic analysis of the system, i.e., with a de-
bugger, and hence observe a set of system states and transitions of the real
system.
The perceptions and observations of the analyst, along with a means to map
concrete states and transitions to abstract FSM states and transitions, allows
them to construct a RFSM (θR) from the emulator for a AFSM. The granularity
of the RFSM will be dependent upon how a system is analysed, e.g., a tool such
as IDA Pro will capture components as groups of basic blocks, while components
identified in source-code can be represented with a higher-level of abstraction.
3.2 Backdoor Definition
The implementation strategies of backdoor implementers varies widely, therefore,
we consider the notion of an abstract backdoor, which we decompose into com-
ponents. In order to do this, we attempt to answer a number of questions: what
is it that makes a set of functionalities, when interacting together manifest as a
backdoor? What abstract component parts can be found in all such backdoors?
To what extent do we need to abstract to identify all such components?
A distinguishing feature of all backdoors is that they must be triggered. Thus,
a pivotal component of any backdoor is its trigger mechanism. However, this trig-
ger mechanism alone does not constitute a backdoor: what causes it to become
active? Another component is needed to account for the satisfaction of the trigger
condition: i.e., a type of input source. Upon trigger activation an eventual sys-
tem state is reached that can be considered the backdoor-activated state, which is
essentially a state of escalated privileges, privilege abuse or unauthenticated ac-
cess, i.e., a privileged state. To reach this final state, an intermediate component
that facilitates the transition from the normal system state upon satisfaction
of the backdoor trigger to the backdoor-activated state is required: we refer to
this as the backdoor payload. Through this reasoning, we show there are four
key components that must be present to fully capture the notion of a backdoor.
These components are chosen as the minimum set of components required for
a backdoor to exist within a system; without the presence of any one of these
components the backdoor would not be functional. Using this componentisation,
we are able to define a backdoor.
Definition 1. Backdoor An intentional construct contained within a system
that serves to compromise its expected security by facilitating access to otherwise
privileged functionality or information. Its implementation is identifiable by its
decomposition into four components: input source, trigger, payload, and privileged
state, and the intention of that implementation is reflected in its complete or
partial (e.g., in the case of bug-based backdoors) presence within the DFSM and
AFSM, but not the EFSM of the system containing it.
3.3 Backdoor Detection
Using Definition 1 as a basis, a backdoor can be modelled as two related FSMs:
θtrigger, which represents the trigger without a state transition to the payload,
and θpayload, which represents the payload and Fpayload, the set of possible priv-
ileged states.
Definition 2. Backdoor Detection A backdoor is detected by obtaining:
θR = (SR, iR, FR, ΣR, δR)
Within θR, the states and transitions of both the trigger and payload must exist:
Σtrigger ∪Σpayload ⊆ ΣR
∀s ∈ Strigger,∀σ ∈ Σtrigger. δtrigger(s, σ) 6= ⊥ ⇒ δR(s, σ) = δtrigger(s, σ)
∀s ∈ Spayload,∀σ ∈ Σpayload. δpayload(s, σ) 6= ⊥ ⇒ δR(s, σ) = δpayload(s, σ)
The privileged states reachable as a result of the payload are either final states
of θR, or states that can be transitioned from to some state of θR:
Strigger ∪ Spayload ⊆ SR
∀f ∈ Fpayload. f ∈ FR ∨ (f /∈ FR ⇒ ∃σ ∈ ΣR. δR(f, σ) ∈ SR)
The payload must be reachable from the trigger, and there must exist a
transition to the trigger within θR:
∀f ∈ Ftrigger. ∃σ ∈ Σtrigger. δR(f, σ) = ipayload
∃s ∈ SR,∃σ ∈ ΣR. δR(s, σ) = itrigger
4 A Framework for Modelling Backdoors
In this section we detail a framework for decomposing a backdoor into the four
components defined in §3.2; we exhaustively enumerate the types of these com-
ponents which allows us to both identify and reason about them.
In addition to locating a construct consisting of an input source, trigger,
payload, and privileged state, to detect a backdoor, an analyst must demonstrate
that the construct would be part of the DFSM of the system. For open-source
software, this could be done by analysing the source code version control logs,
or in closed-source software, analysing the differences between software versions.
In other cases, where such analysis is not possible, the following framework can
additionally serve as a basis for reasoning about how a backdoor’s components
can indicate an implementer’s intent.
In the proceeding framework, we refer to the RFSM of an end-user that has
analysed a particular system. Initially, that user will expect functionality that
can be modelled by one FSM (their EFSM), and through their analysis they will
learn, or derive another FSM (RFSM) that matches what they have learnt about
the system. Therefore, to discover a backdoor through analysis of the emulator
for the AFSM, the RFSM (post-analysis) will contain a backdoor, if there is one
present in the AFSM, and they are able to identify it.
During the analysis process, new states and state transitions will be added
to the RFSM. We divide these states and state transitions into two categories:
those that are explicit, which we say are discovered (and always exist within the
AFSM) and those that are not explicit, which we say are created (and may not
exist within the AFSM). To serve this distinction with an example, suppose we
have a RFSM that models a program. The explicit states and state transitions
that are added to it through analysis are those that represent basic blocks and
branches that are explicitly part of the program’s code (and will always be part
of the DFSM and AFSM). Those that are added that are not explicit are in a
sense weird states and state transitions, which might, for example, be the states
representing some shellcode.
4.1 Input Source
If we model the satisfaction of a backdoor trigger as a function – is triggered –
as in the state machine diagram in Fig. 2, then we can view it as a function that
takes at least one parameter (implicit or otherwise) – an input source – which is
used to decide which state transition that is made as a result of executing that
function.
is triggered(input source, ...
Activated Not activated
Fig. 2. Idealised Backdoor Trigger.
The value yielded by the input source may be derived from any number of
inputs to the FSM: it could be a string input by the attacker wishing to activate
the backdoor trigger, or it could be the value of the system clock such that during
a specific time period the backdoor trigger becomes active. For this reason we
choose to abstract away from the exact implementation details and use the term
“input source” to represent this component of the backdoor. Note that the input
source is not the value that causes the activation of the backdoor trigger, but
rather describes the origin of that input: e.g., a socket or standard input.
4.2 Trigger Mechanism
The backdoor trigger, under the correct conditions, will cause the execution
of the backdoor payload, which will subsequently elevate the privileges of the
attacker. We model the backdoor trigger as a boolean function where its positive
outcome, i.e., when it outputs true, will cause a state transition to the backdoor
payload. The way the FSM transitions to the payload as a result of the satisfaction
of the trigger conditions can be modelled exhaustively with two cases:
1. The state transition is explicit, hence will always exist within the backdoor
implementer’s DFSM. The backdoor trigger is added to the RFSM by adding
the explicit states and transitions related to satisfying the backdoor trigger
conditions, and adding one or more transitions to the payload, where those
transitions are discovered (not newly created) as part of the analysis.
2. The state transition is not explicit. The trigger is added to the RFSM by
adding explicit states and state transitions related to satisfying the back-
door trigger conditions, and by adding one or more state transitions that
transition to the payload, where those transitions are newly created as part
of the analysis, i.e., they are not explicit.
To visualise these cases, we use concrete examples in which we use a system
that is a single program, where the backdoor is embedded as part of the program.
In the first case, we view a trigger that is obvious and explicit, where the
backdoor is encoded within a single function of the program. This case is shown
in Fig. 2. The backdoor trigger is comprised of the single state required to
satisfy the backdoor trigger conditions, i.e., the one labelled is triggered(...),
bool vulnerable_auth_check(
const char *user, const char *pass) {
char buf[80], hash[32];
strcpy(buf, user); strcat(buf, pass);
create_user_pass_hash(hash, buf);
return check_valid_hash(hash);
}
vulnerable auth check(...
Authenticated Not Authenticated
True FalsePayload
Buffer Overflow
Fig. 3. Bug-based backdoor trigger.
1 strcmp(username, "bugdoor")
2vulnerable password check(... safe user auth(username, ...
True False
Authenticated Not Authenticated
3Payload
Buffer Overflow
Fig. 4. Hybrid bug-based backdoor trigger.
and the state transition to the Activated state. In a more realistic scenario,
the backdoor trigger mechanism may require satisfaction of multiple branch
conditions and/or execution of multiple basic blocks and might be obfuscated.
Irrespective of these implementation details, the core concept is the same: the
collection of checks can be viewed as a single function, whose outcome is used
to decide if the backdoor payload is transitioned to and hence executed or not,
where the transition – a CFG edge in this example – is explicitly part of the
FSM.
While the first case considers conditions that are satisfied within a valid
function CFG, and a transition to the payload which is contained entirely within
that same valid CFG, and thus constitutes normal control-flow, the second case
of backdoor trigger manifests as abnormal control-flow. Within a program, we
can think of such a construct as akin to a program bug that allows control-flow
hijacking. One can conjecture a simple case for this being, a buffer overflow
vulnerability, that when exploited correctly, causes a program to transition to a
backdoor payload, shown in Fig. 3.
Alongside these basic cases, a more complex example of a backdoor trigger
would be one that relies both on explicit checks and a bug, as visualised in Fig. 4.
In this case, a hard-coded credential check against a specific username (bugdoor)
is used to guard access to a vulnerable password check (vulnerable password c-
heck). A username other than bugdoor will cause the standard authentication
routine (safe user auth) to be executed, and only a password with a long
enough length (and specific content) will lead to the execution of the back-
door payload. In this example, the backdoor trigger is comprised of the explicit
states 1 and 2, and the non-explicit state transition between states 2 and 3, i.e.,
the payload state.
Note that to make the case that all vulnerabilities are backdoor trigger mech-
anisms is a false oversimplification, as such a simplification does not differenti-
ate between accidental and intentional program bugs. We discuss the difficulties
present when reasoning about backdoors that are bug-based in §5.
4.3 Payload
A backdoor payload can be viewed as the solution to a puzzle: i.e., how to reach a
privileged state from successfully satisfying the conditions of a backdoor trigger.
In our model, we represent this by the state transition taken in order to reach
a privileged state, and any additional states and state transitions that perform
prerequisite computation following activation of backdoor trigger. In practice, a
payload component can take many forms, however we can exhaustively categorise
all types of payload by how they are modelled as part of a RFSM, and how they
are transitioned to:
1. The transition to the payload is explicit, and does not permit the creation of
new states and state transitions (Fig. 5). The payload is added to the RFSM
by adding explicit states and transitions required to reach a privileged state,
where those states and transitions are discovered by analysis (explicit). They
will be contained in the backdoor implementer’s DFSM.
2. The transition to the payload is explicit, but state(s) reachable due to this
transition permit the creation of new states and transitions, e.g., a system
that contains an intentional interpreter which can be accessed via a backdoor
(Fig. 6). The payload is added to the RFSM by adding discovered (explicit)
states and transitions – which exist in the backdoor implementer’s DFSM –
from which both newly created (non-explicit) and discovered (explicit) states
and transitions can be reached, which facilitate the eventual transition to a
privileged state. The non-explicit states and transitions added will not exist
within the backdoor implementer’s DFSM.
3. The transition to the payload is not explicit (bug-based), and the payload’s
states and transitions will either be explicit or non-explicit, e.g., a ROP-
based construct. The payload is added to the RFSM by adding both newly
created (non-explicit) and discovered (explicit) states and transitions, which
facilitate the transition to a privileged state. The non-explicit states and
transitions added will not exist within the backdoor implementer’s DFSM.
4.3.1 Payload examples
To give concrete examples of the variants of backdoor payload, we once again
demonstrate backdoors that are implemented within programs.
Explicit transition to payload with explicit payload components This
class of payload (case 1 above) is inherently an intentional construct and requires
no abnormal control flow for it to be executed. An example of a backdoor with
such payload is shown in Fig. 5. The backdoor trigger condition (state 1) is a
hard-coded credential check, which if satisfied, will transition to the backdoor
payload (transition from state 1 to 2). In the payload, the backdoor user’s per-
missions are first elevated (state 2) and then a shell is opened for that user (state
3), which allows them to transition to the privileged state (state 4).
/* Trigger; if active then: (1) -> (2) */
if (strcmp(user._name, "backdoor") == 0) {
/* Payload */
user._is_admin = true; // (2)
/* Transition to privileged state */
open_shell(&user); // (3) -> (4)
}
1
2
3
4
Trigger
Payload
Fig. 5. Explicit transition to payload, where payload has explicit components.
/* Trigger; if active then: (1) -> (2) */
if (strcmp(req._path, "/BKDRLDR") == 0) {
/* Payload; req._data == payload input */
run(&req._data); // (2) -> (3)
}
1 2
Trigger
Input for Payload
3
Payload
Fig. 6. Explicit transition to payload with both explicit and non-explicit components.
Explicit transition to payload with explicit and non-explicit payload
components In this case (case 2 above), we model a backdoor that enables
an attacker to perform computation not part of the developer’s DFSM, without
being in a state that is bug-induced. An example of such a backdoor is shown in
Fig. 6; if the backdoor trigger is satisfied, the program will interpret and execute
an input supplied by the user of the backdoor. The trigger condition is a check
to see if a user is requesting access to a specific path (state 1), if it is, then the
payload is transitioned to (state 1 to 2), where the data sent with the request
(req. data) is used as input to an interpreter (state 2, via run). In this case, the
privileged state (state 3) transitioned to is dynamically constructed as a result
of the input to the interpreter executed in state 2.
void some_function() {
char buf[80];
/* ... */
/* Backdoor activated if len(input)
causes buffer overflow */
strcpy(buf, input); // (1) -> (2)
return;
}
void other_function() {
/* ... */
/* Payload reaches via (2) -> (3) */
g_user._is_admin = true; // (3)
open_control_panel(); // (4)
}
1
3
4
2
Trigger Payload
Fig. 7. Non-explicit transition to payload, where payload has both explicit and non-
explicit components.
Non-explicit transition to payload with explicit and non-explicit pay-
load components In the final case (case 3 above), we model backdoors that
have a trigger mechanism that is bug-based, i.e., allows an attacker to perform
computation not part of the developer’s DFSM. We visualise such a case in Fig. 7;
here the trigger consists of an intentional buffer overflow bug in some function
(state 1), which if exploited – in this case with a ROP-based payload – transi-
tions (via 1 to 2) to the payload. The payload consists of states 2 and 3, and
the transitions from states 2 to 3, and 3 to 4. As a result of the payload, the
user is granted administrative privileges (state 3), and entered into a (privileged)
control panel via open control panel in other function (state 4).
if (strcmp(password, "_BACKDOOR_") == 0 \
|| is_valid_password(password)) {
// Authenticated
} else {
// Not authenticated
}
1
2
strcmp(...
Authenticated
is valid password(...
Not Authenticated
Trigger
Payload
Fig. 8. A backdoor payload composed solely of a state transition.
Single transition payloads We note there is a special case for both cases 1
and 3, namely, where the payload is composed of only a single state transition.
That is, no additional computation is undertaken as part of the payload, rather
the payload shares its state transition with the backdoor trigger, as shown in
Fig. 8. This special case accounts for situations where the backdoor trigger acts
like a trapdoor (state 1), allowing an attacker to bypass a (potentially) more
complex check for user-authentication, and rather provides a direct transition
to a privileged state (the transition from state 1 to 2). The form of the payload
is identical for cases 1 and 3, other than the explicitness of the state transition
(the payload) between the trigger and the privileged state.
4.3.2 Payload obfuscation
So far, we have not considered how a backdoor implementer might hide a back-
door’s presence – other than by using a bug-based trigger mechanism. While such
a trigger is simple to implement, it offers the implementer no control over how
the backdoor will eventually be used; this control can be regained, by for exam-
ple, limiting the computational freedom of newly created states. In this section
we explore how a backdoor implementer can obfuscate payload components.
Since backdoor payloads that contain only explicit states and state transitions
are obvious and thus, intentional constructs, an obfuscated payload by nature
must be implemented through the use of some degree of abnormal control flow,
i.e., non-explicit states and state transitions. An example of such a payload is
one derived by reusing components of the system it is implemented within to
obscure its execution, e.g., for a program, from static analysis methods. From an
attacker’s perspective, the only way to execute such a backdoor is either to have
prior knowledge of the payload, or solve a puzzle and derive it from the original
system. Andriesse et al. [14] describe such a backdoor (examined in further detail
in §6), whereby its payload component is composed of multiple code fragments
embedded and distributed throughout a binary which execute in sequence upon
the backdoor being triggered. Fig. 7 shows a na¨ıve example such a payload.
Another example is that where a payload can be derived from attacker con-
trolled data. In the simplest case, this is akin to shellcode often executed as
a result of successful exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability: it shares
a commonality that it doesn’t rely upon any existing program components. In
more sophisticated cases, such a backdoor payload might take a hybrid approach:
where either user-data is interpreted by the program itself, or components of the
program are used alongside the user input. Fig. 6 shows a simple example such
a payload. In both of these examples, the payload components are implemented
in a so-called weird machine as defined by Oakley and Bratus [16].
4.4 Privileged State
Following successful activation of the backdoor trigger and subsequent transi-
tioning from the associated payload, the system will enter into a privileged state.
There are two possibilities for this state: either it can be reached under normal
system execution, or it can only be reached through activation of the backdoor.
If we consider privileged states by how they are added to a RFSM, then one that
is newly created, i.e., is non-explicit, will not be reachable under normal system
execution, meanwhile, one that is explicit, may or may not be reachable under
normal execution: for example, while the privileged state might be explicit, the
only way to reach it might be via the backdoor trigger.
In the case of a privileged state reachable through normal execution, consider
the backdoor presented in Fig. 8, which models a hard-coded credential check.
The privileged state (state 2) of the backdoor is both reachable via the backdoor
trigger (from state 1), and the state labelled is valid password.
For the other case, where the privileged state is not reachable by a legiti-
mate user, it is essentially guarded by the activation of the backdoor. This case
can further be sub-categorised. The first variant is where the privileged state is
explicit, as in Fig. 5; the privileged state (state 4) is only reachable through ac-
tivation of the backdoor trigger (state 1 and the transition from state 1 to state
2). In this example, the privileged state manifests as an undocumented backdoor
shell, where after entering a specific username, the attacker is able to perform
additional functionality, not otherwise possible. The other variant is a privileged
state that provides an attacker access to functionality that is not available to
a legitimate user, where that functionality does not explicitly exist within the
system – as shown in Fig. 6. Here the privileged state (state 3) is some function
of attacker input, i.e., the result of run(&req. data).
5 Practical Detection & Deniability
Backdoor detection in practice will happen through, e.g., manually reverse-
engineering a program binary or observing a backdoor’s usage through suspi-
cious system events, such as anomalous network traffic. As is, our proposed
framework oversimplifies as it doesn’t model intention. If we knew that a par-
ticular vulnerability was placed intentionally, then there would be no question
that the vulnerability was placed deliberately to act as a backdoor. Thus, in this
section we answer the question: if we have identified a backdoor-like construct,
can we distinguish it from an accidental vulnerability, and if so, how deniable is
it?
In order to make such a distinction, recall that we can view a system from
four perspectives: its DFSM, AFSM, EFSM, and RFSM. If a backdoor-like con-
struct has been identified, then it will be present in both the emulator for the
AFSM and the RFSM. To state that the construct is a backdoor – and was
placed intentionally – we must show that it, or some part of it was present
within the DFSM. In some cases, the intent is explicit and hard-coded in the
implementation – i.e., it leaves no ambiguity. The most obvious example of this
is a hard-coded credential check which serves to bypass standard authentica-
tion. Indeed, all cases of backdoor that transition explicitly, i.e., discoverable by
analysis, from the satisfaction of their trigger conditions to their payload can be
considered intentional.
In the other case, where that transition is non-explicit, i.e., bug-based, vari-
ous approaches can be taken. For instance, in the case of software, where version
control logs are available, it is possible to identify the exact point where a back-
door has been inserted as well as its author (e.g., the failed attempt to backdoor
the Linux kernel in 2003 [1]). For binary-only software, where there exists mul-
tiple versions of that software, it is possible to identify the version the backdoor
was introduced in, and reason about its presence by asking the question was
there a legitimate reason for making such a change to the software? Further,
we can consider the explicitness of the backdoor components: for example, if
a code fragment exists within a binary that does nothing more than facilitate
privilege escalation, and it is unreachable by normal program control-flow, then
there is an indication of intent. A similar case can be made if the satisfaction
of the trigger conditions rely on checks discoverable by analysis, as well as a
bug. Unfortunately, all of these approaches have non-technical aspects and rely
on human intuition – thus, do not provide a concrete proof of intent. We are
therefore left with three possible ways to classify backdoor-like constructs:
Definition 3. Intentional backdoor Those constructs that can be unam-
biguously identified as backdoors: the transition from their trigger satisfaction
to their payload is explicit. Will be present in the DFSM, AFSM, and if found,
the RFSM, but not the EFSM.
Definition 4. Deniable backdoor Those constructs that fall into a grey area,
where the transition from their trigger satisfaction to their payload is non-explicit
(i.e., it appears to be a bug), but from a non-technical perspective can be argued
to be intentional. Will be present in the AFSM, if found, the RFSM, but not
the EFSM; we cannot definitively tell if it is in the DFSM.
Definition 5. Accidental vulnerability Those constructs where there is no
evidence – technical, or otherwise – to suggest any intent, and the transition
from their trigger satisfaction to their payload is non-explicit. Will be present in
the AFSM, and if found, the RFSM, but not the DFSM or EFSM.
From a purely technical perspective, a deniable backdoor will be indistin-
guishable from an accidental vulnerability. Consider, for example, a simple buffer
overflow vulnerability and its corresponding exploit. If this vulnerability was de-
liberately placed then it is a backdoor, otherwise it is just a vulnerability coupled
with an exploit. As we do not know anything about the implementer’s intention
we cannot discern between the two. Thus, a vulnerability can be seen as an un-
intentional way to add new state transitions, or states to a system’s FSM, while
an exploit is a set of states and state transitions such that when combined with a
vulnerability within a given FSM, provides a means to compromise the believed
security of the system modelled by that FSM. In contrast to backdoors and vul-
nerabilities, a construct providing standard privileged access will be intentional
and manifest within the DFSM, AFSM, EFSM, and RFSM of a system.
6 Discussion & Case-studies
In order to demonstrate our framework, we provide a number of case studies.
We show examples from both the literature and real-world backdoors, which
have been detected manually. For each backdoor, we reason about if and why
its implementation can be considered deniable in respect to our definitions and
analyse it by performing a complete decomposition of its implementation using
our framework. Finally, we provide a discussion of how our framework can be
used to reason about methods for detecting backdoors.
Table 1 shows eleven real-world backdoors, each decomposed using our frame-
work. As each backdoor can be modelled with explicit states and state transi-
tions, by definition 3, none are deniable, thus, their implementers should be held
accountable. The remainder of this section provides case-study of a complex,
deniable (by definition 4) backdoor.
Nginx Bug-Based Backdoor Andriesse and Bos [14] describe a general method
for embedding a backdoor within a program binary. Their technique utilises a
backdoor trigger based upon an intentional program bug combined with a hard-
coded payload composed of intentionally misaligned instruction sequence frag-
ments. Their payload is, in a sense, obfuscated, yet fixed; its implementation
exploits the nature of the x86 instruction set, whereby byte sequences represent-
ing instructions can be interpreted differently when accessed at different offsets.
The authors demonstrate their approach by modifying the popular web-
server, Nginx, and embedding a remotely exploitable backdoor. In their imple-
mentation, a would-be attacker provides a crafted input, which serves to satisfy
the backdoor trigger conditions; this input is provided as a malformed HTTP
packet – the input source will therefore be a network socket. Fig. 9 provides a
code listing adapted from [14] which contains the backdoor trigger conditions.
Those conditions are: have err == 1, and err handler != NULL, which are set
as a result of the use of uninitialised variables have err and err handler in
the ngx http finalize request function, which take the values of badc and
hash in ngx http parse header line. The bug manifests due to the fact the
two functions stack frames overlap between their invocations. The intended pay-
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ngx_int_t ngx_http_parse_header_line(/* ... */) {
u_char badc; /* last bad character */
ngx_uint_t hash; /* hash of header, same size as pointer */
/* ... */
}
void ngx_http_finalize_request(ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_int_t rc) {
uint8_t have_err; /* overlaps badc */
void (*err_handler)(ngx_http_request_t *r); /* overlaps hash */
/* ... */
if(rc == NGX_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST && have_err == 1 && err_handler) {
err_handler(r); /* points to hidden code, set by trigger */
}
}
void ngx_http_process_request_headers(/* ... */) {
rc = ngx_http_parse_header_line(/* ... */);
/* ... */
ngx_http_finalize_request(r, NGX_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST); /* bad header */
}
Fig. 9. Source-code listing for Nginx backdoor trigger.
load states are meant to be those embedded as weird states, however additional
states are possible, for example, if the attacker provides a different input packet
to that expected by the implementers. The privileged state depends on the back-
door payload. We visualise the backdoor in Fig. 10; the trigger is captured by
state 1 and the non-explicit, bug-based transition to state 2; the payload consists
of state 2 and the transition between state 2 and 3; state 3 is the privileged state.
ngx http parse header line(...)
ngx http finalize request(...)
1
2
3
have err == 1 && err handler != NULL
Fig. 10. Multi-layered FSM for Nginx backdoor.
From a technical standpoint the backdoor is deniable (by definition 4), this
is due to its trigger transition being bug-based, whilst its payload, if discovered,
is arguably intentional. The componentisation using our framework allows us
to visualise a complex backdoor succinctly, which would otherwise be buried
across multiple functions in thousands of lines of source code. Further, its com-
ponentisation allows us to reason about how such a backdoor can be detected:
for example, we could attempt to detect its bug-based trigger condition using
symbolic execution; alternatively, we could heuristically attempt to identify its
payload by scanning for misaligned instruction sequences that branch to other
instruction sequences of the same kind, where the combination of those sequences
would serve to elevate an attacker’s privileges.
Table 2. Tool detection methodology decomposed using framework.
Tool Input source Trigger Payload Privileged State
Firmalice [19] Partial Partial No Partial
HumIDIFy [22] Partial No Partial No
Stringer [21] No Partial Partial No
Weasel [14] No Partial Partial Partial
6.1 Backdoor Detection Methodologies
Our framework provides not only a means to reason about backdoors, but also
backdoor detection techniques. Table 2 shows the decomposition of the detection
methodologies of four state-of-the-art backdoor detection tools. Each tool claims
to detect a particular subset of backdoor types. However, while these tools are
all effective, none consider a complete model of backdoors, and, as a result, are
limited in their effectiveness.
Firmalice [19] is designed to detect authentication bypass vulnerabilities. It
uses a so-called security policy to define the observable side-effects of a program
being in a privileged state. Using a specified input source, it attempts to find
data provided via this input source that satisfies the conditions – i.e., akin to a
backdoor trigger – required to observe the side-effects specified by the security
policy. Firmalice has no notion of a payload state; when entered, a payload state
might leave a program in a privileged state that is not captured by a given
security policy, for instance, where the privileged state reached by a backdoor
user is different from that of a legitimate user reaches, e.g., the Q-See DVR
backdoor from Table 1. Firmalice is able to detect such a privileged state by
modification of the input security policy, however, to do so will require the same
amount of manual analysis to detect the entire backdoor as it would to identify
the privileged state.
HumIDIFy [22] aims to detect if a program can execute functionality it should
never execute under normal circumstances. This might be the establishment of
a suspicious input source, or the execution of API that is considered anomalous,
i.e., what might be part of a backdoor payload. However, since it does not consider
the notion of a trigger, it is unable to distinguish between abnormal program
behaviour that is benign – because it can only be performed by a legitimate user,
and behaviour that is genuinely anomalous – that is part of a backdoor. Again,
this is due to their approach not considering a complete model of a backdoor.
Stringer [21] attempts to detect static data used as program input that is
responsible for either enabling authentication bypass vulnerabilities, or used for
triggering the execution of undocumented functionality. To do this it uses a
scoring metric, which ranks static data, that when matched against, leads to
the execution of unique functionality, i.e., functionality not reachable by other
program paths. Stringer considers the partial notion of a backdoor trigger and
uses heuristics for identifying payload-like constructs. It does not consider the
notion of input source, or privileged states, and as a result of the latter, is unable
to meaningfully score data that leads to states that are actually privileged higher
than those that are not.
Weasel [14] detects both authentication bypass vulnerabilities and undocu-
mented commands in server-like program binaries. It works by attempting to
automatically identify so-called deciders (akin to backdoor triggers) and han-
dlers (akin to the combination of a backdoor payload and privileged state) which
then serve to aid in detection of backdoors. Their approach does not fully model
the notion of a backdoor; it does not consider an input source at all, rather,
the approach models a single input for the program, and data from that source,
when processed, is assumed to reveal all deciders and handlers. The Tenda web-
server backdoor in Table 1 acts as an undocumented command interface, its
input source is a UDP port; in this case, the backdoor uses a separate input
source from the standard input to the program, i.e., TCP port 80 or 443. Since
Weasel does not capture the notion of an input source, it will be unable to detect
such a backdoor – not due to a deficiency in its detection method, but because
it does not consider a complete model of a backdoor.
7 Future work
Our framework does not intend to provide a direct means to detect backdoors,
rather it serves as a general means to decompose backdoors in an abstract way.
In §6.1, we discuss concrete implementations of detection methodologies; in each
case we are able to highlight deficiencies in those methods due to them not fully
capturing the rigorous definition of a backdoor, as outlined in this work. Thus, a
backdoor detection methodology based upon our proposed framework would be
a natural extension of this work. Further, while our formalisations attempt to
capture any backdoor-like functionality, backdoors introduced into a system by,
e.g., a deliberate side-channel vulnerability would prove difficult to model using
our FSM-based abstraction; we view this as an additional area for investigation.
8 Conclusion
In summary, we have provided a definition for the term backdoor, definitions for
backdoor detection, deniable backdoors, and a means to discern between inten-
tional backdoors and accidental vulnerabilities. We have presented a framework
to aid in identifying backdoors based upon their structure, which also serves as
a means to compare existing backdoor detection approaches, and as a basis for
developing new techniques. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we
have analysed twelve backdoors of varying complexity. In each case, we have been
able to concisely model those backdoors, which previously, might have manifested
as hundreds or thousands of assembly language instructions in a disassembler.
We have used our framework to evaluate four state-of-the-art backdoor detection
approaches, and in all cases, have shown that none consider a complete model
of backdoors, and, as a result, their potential effectiveness is limited.
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